This paper introduces ∆Breakpad. It extends the Breakpad crash reporting system to handle software diversity effectively and efficiently by replicating and patching the debug information of diversified software versions. Simple adaptations to existing open source compiler tools are presented that on the one hand introduce significant amounts of diversification in the code and stack layout of ARMv7 binaries to mitigate the widespread deployment of code injection and code reuse attacks, while on the other hand still supporting accurate crash reporting. An evaluation on SPEC2006 benchmarks demonstrates that the corresponding computational, storage, and communication overheads are small.
One of the customer support issues relates to crash collectors. Google Breakpad (http://code.google.com/p/ google-breakpad/), e.g., is a small software component that can be embedded in applications to facilitate the collection of useful crash reports, even when the application binaries are distributed to end users without debug information. Its operation involving three parties is visualized in Figure 1 . When the application crashes on a user's system, the embedded Breakpad component sends a stack dump (called minidump) to the crash collector server. On that server, a tool then combines the minidump information with the debug information stored in a so-called symbol file on the server. The tool then generates a stack trace, which most often is first analyzed and classified automatically. If no equivalent traces are found in a database of previously received traces, the vendor's developers are notified that a previously unknown bug or previously unknown trigger has been identified, at which point they can start to study the trace manually. For obvious reasons, crash collector tools like Breakpad have become quite popular.
With spatial diversification schemes in which different users of an application execute different code versions, the described crash collector system no longer works out of the box. Unless the crash collector stores symbol files for all of the diversified versions, it lacks the necessary information to identify and interpret the diversified stack frames in the received minidumps. Simplistic solutions to overcome the mismatch between diversified minidumps and a single symbol file, such as permanently storing debug information for all diversified versions, are infeasible because symbol files are quite large. The alternative solution of rebuilding a software version and its debug information on the server when a crash report comes in is impractical as well: For larger programs, recompilation of every crashed version would be compute-intensive, and it requires the precise reproduction of the developer's build environment in the crash collection environment, which might reside on a third party's infrastructure. Even if the precise reproduction would be considered technically feasible, it will often be unacceptable because of security requirements, such as confidentiality.
As an alternative solution, we can extend both the diversified stack dumps and the single instance of debug infor- mation stored on the crash collector server with a minimal amount of delta data [8] . Its purpose is to let the crash collection tool overcome the mismatch between the diversified stack dumps and a single instance of debug information, without requiring large amounts of persistent storage, compute power, or communication bandwidth. Concretely, our objective is to enable a crash collector server to reconstruct the symbol file of diversified copies of an application with a minimal amount of delta data, that requires minimal extra storage and communication bandwith. Within this solution framework, the research question then becomes the following: To what extent can we adopt diversification schemes to provide more protection than simple ASLR without bloating the delta data needed to support crash collection?
This is a non-trivial question because in compilers, seemingly trivial diversifications of local code fragments can have global effects. On RISC architectures in particular, we have observed that even minimal changes to the offsets between pairs of instructions or to the sizes of stack frames can impact decisions made during instruction selection, register allocation, and instruction scheduling [9] . As a result, even when it is possible to predict the direct impact of a diversification scheme on the individual code fragments being diversified, it is hard to predict the indirect effects on the surrounding code. Consequently, it is quite impossible to replicate the diversification process on the crash collector server on the basis of only the original binary, its debug information, and the parameters that were used as input to the original diversification process, such as random seeds.
Instead, a mechanism is needed that combines good but imperfect replication of the diversification process with patching that can make up for the imperfection. With the replication part of the approach, the server should be able to recreate a symbol file that is not identical, but quite similar, to the symbol file of the diversified binary from which a crash report is collected. With the patching part, the recreated symbol file will then be patched into the original, diversified symbol file, with which the crash collector can interpret the received stack dump.
To minimize the resource requirements, the replication and patching mechanisms should exploit the fact that they only need to produce sufficient debug information to interpret a stack dump correctly, not the fully working, diversified binary that produced the stack dump. In this context, we consider the production of sufficient information equivalent to restoring the full symbol file. This comes down to the implicit assumption that Google designed Breakpad's symbol file format to contain exactly the necessary information.
This paper provides a first answer to the above research question by presenting ∆Breakpad. Its approach and prototype tool support is the first practical solution to the problem of crash reporting for applications with fine-grained layout diversification as a defense against code injection and code reuse exploits. The tool and the presented techniques comprise minimal adaptations to the compiler to perform code and stack layout diversification to significantly raise the bar for attackers, and to generate the necessary, minimal delta data. It also comprises a method to bridge the gap between a diversified stack dump and the debug information of an undiversified copy of the software on the crash collector. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background information and analyses the problem to be solved in terms of offset diversification schemes, debug information required for crash reporting, and the impact of the diversification on this information, on different types of CPU architectures. Next, Section 3 presents an overview and detailed discussion of the ∆Breakpad approach as an extension of Google Breakpad. The results of an experimental evaluation are presented in Section 4, before Section 5 discusses related work and Section 6 draws conclusions. 
BACKGROUND & PROBLEM STATEMENT

Offset Diversification
For our experiments with crash reporting for diversified binaries, we focus on diversification schemes that alter offsets between instructions in a program and offsets between elements in stack frames. We focus on compiled languages such as C and C++ that provide no memory safety [7] . The studied types of diversification have proven to be useful on top of basic ASLR, because they raise the bar for information leak attacks: when offsets within memory segments are diversified on top of the start addresses of the segments, one leaked address no longer directly informs the attackers about the locations of all potentially interesting code or data fragments. We deploy three offset diversification schemes: 1 1) Function Shuffling The order of all the functions in a whole binary is randomized. This randomizes inter-procedural code offsets with high entropy [10] . 2) Randomized NOP Insertion At random locations, for some average frequency, NOPs (no-operations) are inserted into the code bodies of all the functions. This randomizes intra-procedural code offsets [11] . 3) Randomized Stack Padding A random number of bytes is inserted in between the stack locations of buffers and those of the return addresses [1] . The impact on the stack frames is visualized in Figure 2 . It randomizes the distance from buffers to stored return addresses, as well as the distances between return addresses in different stack frames.
To implement these forms of diversification, stochastic decision processes typically decide on the function ordering, on the locations to insert NOPs, and on the amounts of stack padding to insert. The stochastic decision processes are deterministic. They can be based on a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). To generate diversified code fragments, it then suffices to feed the PRNG different random seeds. Alternatively, they can be based on hashing functions. To generate diversification, it then suffices to feed the hashing function different keys.
As the three diversification schemes are conceptually simple, their decision processes do not involve checks of complex pre-conditions on the code fragments to be diversified. In other words, even when the diversification 1. We do not claim that the proposed combination of technique offers the most powerful protection. We simply deploy a composition of existing techniques to demonstrate and validate the proposed approach. schemes are deployed in complex tools such as compilers, in which the application of some scheme can cause indirect effects on the code by triggering transformations later down the compilation process, no complex compiler technology is needed to replicate the decision processes themselves. All of the necessary information to replicate them (such as function names, function body sizes, ...) is readily available in standard debug information, as will be discussed in the next section, or can trivially be generated during the compilation process, without needing to make large changes to the compilers.
A direct effect of all three the diversification schemes is that offsets encoded in the code section of a binary change. With the first two schemes, the displacements between instructions change, as does the offset of all instructions relative to the start of the code segment of the binary. In the code section, this implies that PC-relative offsets encoded in, e.g., direct control flow transfers change. With the second scheme, the direct changes occur in the displacements between the base pointer and stack pointer on the one hand, and the data items in a stack frame on the other hand. So offsets encoded in stack memory operations change, and so do the immediate operands of instructions that produce pointers to stack-allocated data. In all three schemes, the diversification hence results in changes to offsets encoded in instructions as immediate operands. The indirect effect of those changes on the debug information depends significantly on the type of processor architecture, as we discuss in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
Necessary Debug Information
Conceptually, the debug information of interest, which is embedded in the symbol files used by Breakpad, consists of source line information on the one hand and stack unwinding information on the other hand. For both forms of information, the code is partitioned in regions, i.e., in short sequences of consecutive instructions. The line information then consists of a single list of regions. For each region, the start address, the size, and the corresponding source file and source line number are stored. In the symbol files that Breakpad uses, this information is stored in human-readable form, as shown in Figure 3 . Each line containing only (hex) numbers corresponds to one region.
The stack unwinding information also consists of a list of regions. For each region the start address and size stored. In addition, for each region information is stored that pinpoints where in the program state the stack unwinder can find the information necessary to unwind a stack. Figure 4 shows an example excerpt of a symbol file for an ARMv7 binary. The post-fix expressions on registers (sp, r11, lr, ...) express how to compute the necessary properties of the frames on the stack when execution has reached a program point in a given region. These properties are the canonical frame address (.cfa), the return address (.ra), and the values of callee-saved registers in a function's caller. The first three records in the symbol file excerpt relate to function1, which has a FP (=r11 according to the ARM EABI), as can be seen in the assembly code of its prologue. The expression for .cfa on the first line encodes that on entry to function1, the stack pointer (SP) still points to the start of the function's stack frame. The second line clarifies that after the push instruction, two callee-saved registers can be found on the stack, and that the SP now points 8 bytes beyond the start of the frame.
So in essence, when replicating the diversification of a binary to support the construction of a stack trace from undiversified debug information, we need to be able to replicate changes to the number and ordering of regions, changes to their start addresses and sizes, and changes to the locations where relevant pieces of program state are stored.
We observed that in the symbol files of our benchmark suites, about 90% of the records specify line number information, and about 7% provide stack unwinding information, with the rest spend on descriptions of the files and paths, and on the interfaces that are exported. Those 7% do occupy about 20% of the symbol file size, however: as can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 , stack unwinding records are much longer than code/line region records.
Indirect effects in x86 binaries
On variable-width CISC architectures such as Intel's x86, the indirect effects of the used diversification schemes are mostly limited to additional changes in the displacements between instructions. When, as a result of a changed offset, less or more bytes are required to encode the offset as an immediate operand, the x86 compiler will simply generate another form of the same instruction that uses less or more bytes. In addition, as the compiler might decide to put certain instructions on specific alignments, e.g., to optimize instruction fetching or instruction caching, the compiler might insert different amounts of padding when the location of code fragments is altered because of the diversification. Most often, these changes only alter the addresses and sizes of regions in the symbol files.
More or less the same happens as a result of the additional, randomized stack padding that is inserted. In many functions, no instructions are present in the function prologues/epilogues that only increment/decrement the SP. To allocated/deallocate the additional randomized padding in such functions, additional instructions have to be inserted in the prologue/epilogue. In the symbol file, this comes mostly down to splitting regions in the stack unwinding information: one region before the SP increment/decrement, and one region after it.
So replicating the effect of diversification on the debug information stored on a crash collector requires updating the number, addresses, and sizes of regions, as well as the offsets where relevant state is stored in stack frames. To do so, it suffices for the crash collector to have (i) the original, undiversified binary including its debug information; (ii) a script that replays the deterministic decision processes of the randomizing diversification schemes; (iii) the seeds and keys that were used for generating the diversified binary.
So on architectures like the x86, for extending the flow of Figure 1 to support binaries diversified with the three studied schemes, it suffices to embed the seeds and keys in the diversified binary, to extend the Breakpad client to let it send the seeds and keys along with the minidump to the crash collector, and to extend the Breakpad minidump processor to let it replicate the impact of the diversification process on the symbol file. For that replication, not the whole original compiler is needed. Instead, a simple script suffices that replays the stochastic diversification decision processes for the program at hand, i.e., taking into account the alignment requirements of the individual program fragments and the locations where different types of offsets are encoded in the code. A complete approach that covers these features and more is presented in Section 3.
Indirect effects in ARMv7 binaries
On architectures like the ARMv7 RISC architecture, the situation is quite different. 2 The same effect plays, e.g., with respect to the function prologues and epilogues, but in addition, there are many more indirect changes as a result of offset diversification. There are three underlying reasons.
Fixed-width instruction encoding. ARMv7 instructions are 16-bit or 32-bit wide. The immediate operands of ALU and LD/ST instructions can therefore only be quite narrow, so when offsets grow bigger because of diversification, it can become impossible to encode them as immediate operands.
2. The 32-bit part of the ARMv8 architecture, which is still omnipresent on mobile devices, is mostly identical to ARMv7. Instead, the offsets then have to be stored in registers. This requires additional instructions and puts extra pressure on the register allocator, as a result of which instructions can also become scheduled in different orders. In fact, we have observed that if the same offset has to be generated multiple times, the compiler sometimes applies commonsubexpression-elimination [9] , which can have a global impact on register allocation and instruction scheduling. Furthermore, we have observed that the compiler sometimes changes the base register used in LD/ST instructions, e.g., when the offsets of a location in the stack frame relative to the SP and/or the FP change.
Rotating immediate operands. The ARMv7 architecture has a peculiar way of encoding offsets as 8 consecutive bits that can be rotated over a 5-bit amount. It therefore also happens that offsets that could not be encoded as immediate operands in the original binary, become perfectly fine ones after they have become bigger in the diversified binary. For example, whereas an original offset 0x3ff0 cannot be encoded in an immediate operand, such encoding works perfectly fine for the increased offset 0x4000 that can result from adding stack frame padding.
The visible program counter. ARMv7 code typically contains a sizable amount of PC-relative computations, both in position independent and dependent code. The reason is the visible program counter (PC). To produce constant values that cannot be encoded in individual immediate operands, such as vectors of numerical values to be used by vector instructions, and constants unknown at compile time, such as absolute addresses or inter-modular offsets, those constants are often loaded from so-called literal pools: data chunks dispersed in between the code. These pools are accessed through PC-relative load operations. As our diversification schemes can result in changes to the sizes of code fragments, and as only narrow offsets can be encoded, the diversification affects the location where the compiler injects the literal pools into the stream of instructions. Whereas on architectures like x86, the order of instructions and literal pools can remain the same even when NOPs are inserted randomly as a form of diversification, that order cannot remain the same in ARMv7 code.
In conclusion, when targeting an architecture like the ARMv7, we have to expect much further reaching changes to the code section contents, even if we only apply our three relatively simple offset diversification schemes. Moreover, on such an architecture it is impossible to replicate the changes to the corresponding symbol file completely without replicating part of the compiler infrastructure that was used during register allocation, instruction selection, and instruction scheduling. In other words, it cannot suffice to put a simple script on the crash collector server to replicate the impact of the diversification on the symbol file.
THE ∆BREAKPAD APPROACH
To overcome the discussed problem, the ∆Breakpad approach combines three main concepts. The first concept is imperfect replication of the diversification process' impact on the symbol file. The second is patching of the imperfect replication result to make it perfect. The crash collector will not only receive the necessary seeds and keys to replicate the diversification decision process, but also a patch that will allow it to fix any imperfection of the performed replication. So the ∆Breakpad client has to send both the minidump, the seeds and keys, and the patch to the crash collector.
The third concept is ∆ minimization, with which we denote the adaptation of the compilation and diversification process to minimize the sizes of the patches that the client has to send to the crash collector. Figure 5 presents an overview of the ∆Breakpad approach. It looks much more complicated than Breakpad in Figure 1 , but the main Breakpad components are still present, and are in fact reused as is. As we will discuss in Section 4, the approach also requires only minimal changes to the build system components (compiler, linker, ...).
Crash Handling & Stack Trace Generation
Importantly, the ∆Breakpad approach does not require any change to the minidump that is sent by the client to the server. The minidump file format as developed by Microsoft is similar to core dump files, but much smaller, better documented, and less OS-specific. A minidump contains • A list of the executable and all shared libraries loaded into the process when the dump was created.
• A list of the process threads, with their stacks and processor register contents. Complete stacks are included because the applications typically do not contain debug information to analyze the stack. • Some more system information, incl. the processor and OS versions, as well as the reason for the crash.
We only need adapt the Breakpad client such that it sends the server a small chunk of ∆data along with the minidump (bottom right of Figure 5 ). This does not require any patch to the core Breakpad library (https://github. com/google/breakpad/) that is to be linked into an application to enable Breakpad crash reporting. That linkedin library is only responsible for dumping the necessary information about a crash to disk. A separate process is then responsible for sending the data to the crash reporter. The goal of that separation of concerns is to minimize the functionality needed within the crashing process after a crash is triggered, because the trigger (e.g., buggy code being executed) may of course also have corrupted the functioning of the linked-in Breakpad functionality. Isolating functionality as much as possible in a separate process protects against such corruption. That separate process needs to be implemented and customized for every OS and usage scenario. For the presented ∆Breakpad approach, we only need to customize it some more.
The ∆data contains the random seeds, keys, and other parameters that the server needs to perform the imperfect replication, as well as the aforementioned patch. If necessary, the ∆data can be encrypted and signed to guarantee authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality.
The crash collector server still persistently stores debug info (i.e., symbol files) of the default binary. No changes to their format are required, so all Breakpad symbol dumper utilities for the major OSs, which simply extract the necessary information from the DWARF or STABS debug sections in ELF object files or from stand-alone PDB (Microsoft's Program Database format) files, still operate out of the box. In addition, the server persistently stores a diversity opportunity log. This log is generated during the default compilation, i.e., when the diversifying tool chain is invoked without applying any actual diversification to generate the default binary. It lists all the opportunities for diversification that occurred during the generation of that binary, but that were, per definition, not yet exploited. For example, it lists all the program points where the diversification process considered (but skipped) inserting NOPs. An essential feature of the diversity opportunity log file is that it lists all decision points where, during an actual diversifying run of the tools, random numbers are drawn from the PRNG, as well the necessary information for determining the options from which one is selected with the random number or on the basis of a hash value at each decision point.
When a crash report arrives on the server, the ∆Breakpad replicator replicates the impact of the diversification process on the symbol file in a couple of steps. First, the replicator extracts, decompresses, and (optionally) decrypts the ∆data.
Next, the replicator extracts the seeds, keys and possi-ble parameters from the ∆data, to replicate the impact of the diversification decision process on the default symbol file by means of the opportunity log. The replicator initializes a PRNG with the same parameters and random seeds that were already used on the build system for the actual diversification of the binary from which the crash report was achieved. The replicator then draws random numbers from that PRNG at each point where the original diversification process had already drawn numbers. For each drawn number, the replicator then adapts the content of the symbol file to reflect approximately what change the diversification step had caused on that file. The same is done for each diversification transformation controlled and decided by means of a hash function. The overall result is an approximation of the diversified symbol file, i.e., the symbol file that the original Breakpad symbol dumper tool had produced on the build system for the diversified binary. It is an approximation because the replicator only models direct effects of the diversification, such as increased region sizes resulting from inserted NOPs, but no secondary effects like the ones discussed in Section 2.4. So finally, the replicator extracts the patch from the ∆data and applies it to the approximation, thus reproducing an exact copy of the diversified symbol file.
As the contents of that diversified symbol file match the contents of the received minidump, the existing Breakpad minidump processor can then be used to produce the human-readable stack trace, which can then be processed as needed. Notice that this stack trace only contains information at the abstraction level of the source code. Crashes occurring in corresponding regions in differently diversified versions of the binaries will hence produce exactly the same stack trace. As such, all existing manual or automatic tools and techniques to analyze and classify the stack traces, e.g., for triaging, still work out of the box.
Generating the ∆data
The top part of Figure 5 shows the adapted build system. On the right, the standard Breakpad symbol dumper flow is shown to generate the default symbol file to be stored persistently on the crash collector server. This symbol file is extracted from the default binary.
On the left of the build system in Figure 5 , the diversified binary is generated, along with the diversification decision process log that consists of the same info as the opportunity log plus a description of the actual result from the applied diversification, and a diversified symbol file. Based on this log and symbol file, and on the default symbol file, the ∆Breakpad symbol differ then generates the ∆data, in particular the patch part of it. Finally, the ∆data packer compresses, and optionally encrypts and signs the data and injects it as an additional section into the stripped diversified executable. The resulting binary is then distributed to the end user, ready to crash.
Combining Multiple Diversification Processes
In order to make the described approach work, we need to ensure that the replication of the decision processes on the crash collector on the basis of the opportunity log generated for the default binary stays synchronized with the decision process as it was executed during the generation of the diversified binary. This is non-trivial when one wants to apply multiple forms of diversification one after the other: As the replication process does not know the exact outcome of an earlier diversification applied to some code fragment, it does not know the exact form of the code fragment onto which the later applied diversification is applied.
For example, suppose randomized padding is injected into a function's stack frame first, and random NOPs are inserted in its code body afterwards, after instruction scheduling has been performed. Given the ordering of compilation phases in a compiler, this is not an unreasonable assumption [9] . As discussed in Section 2.4, the injected padding can cause changes in the number of instructions of the function body. If this actually happens, and if the later NOP insertion process draws a random number for each instruction in the code to decide whether or not to insert a certain number of NOPs after that instruction, the replicator will draw more or less random numbers from the PRNG than were counted during the generation of the default binary.
So in that case, the replication of the decision process on the crash collector will at some point become desynchronized with how the actual diversification was decided. Unless special care is taken, this will result in completely diverging replication from that point on, which can only be compensated by including a huge patch in the ∆data.
To avoid this, two approaches can be combined. First, the decision processes of the combined diversification schemes need to be carefully designed to become mostly, if not completely independent. We achieve this by applying the later decision processes at a granularity of code fragments that is not likely impacted by earlier decision processes.
Trivially, the order in which functions are shuffled is completely independent from the number of NOPs inserted in them, as well as from their stack padding size.
We also observed that although random stack padding and NOP insertion often result in changes in the number of instructions in the function bodies, in particular when the ARMv7 architecture is targeted, they only rarely impact the structure of the functions' control flow graphs (CFGs). The only occasions in which we saw this happening was when trampolines had to be inserted or could be removed as a result of changed displacements in the code, or when basic blocks became so big or small that they (no longer) had to be split, e.g., to provide space for a literal pool.
We can build on this observation by performing the stack padding insertion first, then the function shuffling, and finally the NOP insertion, of which the decision process is performed basic block per basic block, and with a fixed number of random numbers drawn per block. So however the number of instructions in the basic blocks are impacted by the former two diversification steps, as long as the CFG of a function is not impacted, the replicator's decision process will remain synchronized automatically.
Our second approach deals with the few cases where a function's CFG is impacted by the former two diversifications, resulting in a desynchronization. To avoid this desynchronization from spilling over into other functions, i.e., to contain the desynchronization, our ∆data format offers a way to resynchronize the decision process, i.e., the number of drawn random numbers, upon entry to a function. The ∆Breakpad symbol differ can easily determine when and where such resynchronization is needed.
∆ Minimization
Our main research goal is to demonstrate that crash reporting for diversified software is feasible with minimal overhead. So we aim for small ∆data. We have opted not to achieve that small ∆data at all cost, however.
First, we want to make as many of the additional processing steps of the approach as generic as possible. So we opted to design the ∆Breakpad symbol differ, the ∆Breakpad replicator, and the ∆data format to be architecture-independent and compiler-independent.
Furthermore, apart from the restrictions discussed in Section 3.3, we do not want to impose strict limitations on the freedom with which to apply the diversification schemes. For example, when we let a compiler select a randomized amount of stack padding for some function, we do not want to restrict its selection to values that preserve the code schedules in the function body. Besides helping us to keep the diversification process decision logic (in the compiler as well as in the replicator) independent of compiler internals, this ensures that the entropy generated by means of the diversification does not depend more than strictly necessary on artifacts of the code being diversified. From the perspective of security, this is obviously an advantage.
Finally, we also want to limit the changes we need to make to existing compilers and related tools used for generating and/or diversifying the binaries.
What remains then, to minimize the size of the ∆data, is the selection of the default compilation strategy, and a minimal set of adaptations to the compilation tools to enforce that strategy.
For the three forms of offset diversification that we evaluated, we identified two tiny but useful adaptations.
Default Stack Padding
The first adaptation is that for any function to which a random amount of stack padding will be added during the diversification process, the function should get 8 bytes of stack padding in the default, non-diversified binary. During the diversification process itself, it then also gets a randomized number of padding bytes that is a strictly positive multiple of 8.
Because it enforces the insertion of padding operations in all function versions, it limits the number of cases where the code regions in the function prologues and epilogues as listed in the default symbol file need to be split as discussed in Section 2.3 to match the regions in the diversified symbol file. The default padding enforces the inclusion of instructions to allocate and deallocate stack space in the function prologues and epilogues: the single prologue then contains one add sp, sp, #const instruction (or multiple ones, if the size of that stack space, i.e., the const, cannot be encoded as a single immediate operand), and each copy of the epilogues contains one (or more) sub sp, sp, #const instructions, both in the default program version and in the diversified versions. Without the default padding, many functions in the default binary would not contain such SP incrementing/decrementing instructions. For those functions, the default padding minimizes the differences between default and diversified code and their corresponding regions in the symbol files.
For functions that already allocate and deallocate stack space in the default binary, adding default padding is useful as well. We observed quite some functions where the local area of a stack frame only holds relatively large arrays whose sizes are powers of two. In those functions, the aforementioned const operands are large values of which the least significant bits are all zeroes. Those values can hence be encoded as immediate operands in the ARMv7 and similar architectures. By adding another 8 bytes of padding, a lower bit becomes set as well. So then the value can no longer be encoded as an immediate operand in the default binary, just like it will likely not get encoded as an immediate operand in the diversified binary, where a randomized, but still relatively small amount of padding is added. The average difference between the default binary and the diversified binaries, and hence the average amount of information to be stored in the ∆data, is hence reduced.
For other functions, such as those with small local areas, the added 8 bytes typically don't change anything with respect to which offsets can be encoded as immediate operands. So there the added 8 bytes typically do not offer any benefit. But there they typically do not come with any disadvantage either: all stack offsets still can be encoded.
Minimizing the differences that randomized stack padding introduces between default and diversified code fragments is particularly important for the function epilogues; not only to make the corresponding regions in the symbol files more similar to one another, but also to limit indirect effects on the generated code. As a result of the default padding, the epilogues in a function typically have the same size in the default binary and in the diversified binaries. Maintaining the same size for epilogues throughout the stack frame diversification is important for ∆ minimization because the size of basic blocks, which is the form under which epilogues occur in the diversifying compiler's intermediate code representation, plays a significant role in the heuristics that steer many compiler optimizations. For example, in the LLVM compiler, we observed that the tail duplication optimization considers code size (small blocks, including small epilogues, are duplicated more), as do ifconversion and tail merging. We observed that because of the heuristics' dependencies on code size, the insertion of extra instructions in the epilogues can result in significantly altered control flow graphs, not just in terms of shape, but also in terms of size, and in the order in which the blocks are laid out in memory. The introduction of default padding minimizes such alterations. Histograms (a) and (b) in Figure 6 illustrate this very clearly. These histograms show how the function code sizes change as a result of adding 32 different amounts of padding (8, 16 , ..., 256) to each function in our benchmark suite compiled with -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer for part (a) and with -O2 for part (b) -the histograms look similar with other options. The blue and gray histograms show the changes when the default binary does not include 8 bytes of padding, the orange and purple histograms show the changes when the default binary does include 8 bytes of padding. Notice that many size increases and size reductions are obtained exactly 32 or 64 times in the blue and gray histograms. This follows from the fact that the very same increase or reduction in size was observed for all of the 32 diversified versions of a specific function compared to its default version without any padding. In the orange and purple histograms, that situation does not occur. Clearly, the changes on average become much smaller with the default padding. The average (absolute values of the) changes are 6.73 resp. 6.57 bytes/function without default padding, and only 0.052 resp. 0.028 bytes/function with default padding. Also, the orange and purple histograms peak at zero, whereas the blue and gray ones peak at 8. So with the default padding, there are many more functions for which diversified stack padding has no effect at all on code size. Clearly, the default padding of 8 bytes is advantageous for ∆ minimization. These numbers also indicate that the function size deltas between default and diversified files are smaller on average for code compiled with FPs than for code compiled without FPs. The difference is almost completely due to function versions where the non-zero delta when compiled with FP 28  32  36  40  44  48  52  56  60  64  68  72  76  80  84  88  92  100  104  132  136  144  152  160  168  176  192  200  204  208  212  220  224  232  252  256  260  280  288  296  300  316  332  376  392  436  488  528  608  664  752  908  1232  1280  1440  1592 grows bigger (i.e., more positive or more negative) in code compiled without FP. The number of function versions with zero delta compared to the default 8 byte padding version remains almost constant with or without FP: Over 99.95% of the 901K function versions (out of 904k total) that do not grow or shrink in our experiments as a result of stack padding when compiled with FP, still do not grow or shrink when compiled without FP. Notice, by the way, that the default 8-byte padding has no consequence whatsoever on the diversified binaries, i.e., on their size or on their performance: The default padding only influences the default symbol files and the ∆data that will be used to reconstruct the diversified symbol file.
By making all (randomized) amounts of padding a multiple of 8, the padding does not affect the natural alignment of most data in most stack frames. Typically, the data stored in stack frames needs 8-byte alignment or less. Also the application binary interfaces (ABIs) we know only impose at most 8-byte alignments.
An additional advantage is that this adaptation can be implemented very easily in a diversifying compiler, as it is completely architecture-independent, and as it simply comes down to executing the diversified stack padding code with a non-diversified amount.
SP/FP-relative access optimization
In addition to the default stack padding adaptation, we also observed that it can be useful to disable a compiler backend's (ARM-specific) optimization in which FP-relative stack accesses to an element in the stack frame are selected over SP-relative accesses depending on the potential to encode the accesses' offsets to the FP and SP as rotating immediate operands (as discussed in Section 2.4). After disabling that (minor) optimization, the compiler switches less between FP-relative and SP-relative addressing as a result of randomized padding. The diversified binaries therefore again become more similar to the default binary, which ultimately results in smaller ∆data. Histogram (c) in Figure 6 visualizes the effect on function code size of disabling this optimization. On average, the difference in size drops from 0.038 bytes/function to 0.028 bytes/function. In LLVM, e.g., a six-line patch suffices to disable the optimization.
Unlike the default stack padding, this compiler tweak does potentially impact performance. In the SPEC2006 C and C++ benchmarks in our benchmark suite compiled with -O2, we observed no significant average performance impact: the average execution times decreased with the insignificant amount of 0.03%. For individual benchmarks, disabling the optimization resulted into anything between a 3.63% speedup and a 1.43% slowdown. So there can be a small effect, that the software developer in certain performance critical cases may want to trade-off against the potential benefits in terms of ∆ data size. The latter are evaluated in Section 4.
Profile-Guided Diversification
Some forms of diversification can benefit from profile information to reduce the overhead. For example, as it is typically not necessary to insert a random number of NOPs in between every pair of instructions, the performance overhead of NOP-insertion can be reduced by concentrating NOPs on infrequently executed program points [11] . The ∆Breakpad approach supports such profile-guided diversification out of the box: as long as both the default compilation and the diversifying compilation runs are served the same profile information, the decision process logs and the diversity opportunity log will be consistent with each other, so the ∆Breakpad replicator will work just fine.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Experimental Setup
As we want to demonstrate that our approach can work with acceptable ∆data sizes even on architectures that are harder to target, we evaluated it on the more challenging ARMv7 architecture. In particular, our proof-of-concept implementation supports the 32-bit subset of the ARMv7-A architecure (i.e., excluding 16-bit Thumb and Thumb2 code).
Diversification processes can be applied at many stages during the SDLC [4] . To demonstrate the support for combinations applied in multiple stages and tools in the compilation tool chain, we opted for the tool flow in Figure 7 . 
Stack Padding
We adapted LLVM 3.6.2 for randomized stack padding. In our prototype implementation, all functions get a random stack padding between 8 and 256 bytes, but always a multiple of 8 bytes. This ensures that the generated code keeps respecting the ARM EABI, which requires stack frames of non-leaf functions to be aligned on 8-byte boundaries.
The amount of padding to be added to each function is determined by hashing the function's (mangled) name and its source code file name and path. The diversification seed is the key to the hash function. In this stateless scheme, the amount of padding in each function is independent of the order in which functions are compiled. This greatly eases the replay on the crash server, for which all the necessary function, file, and path names are already present in the default symbol file.
An LLVM patch to implement the necessary stack padding capabilities and related command-line options is 42 lines of code in total. All of this patch is generic, i.e., in architecture-independent code, except for 6 lines to disable the FP/SP-relative stack access optimization in the ARM back-end discussed in Section 3.4.
Function Shuffling
Next, we use the GNU linker ld for shuffling functions. In preparation for this, we use the -ffunction-sections compiler flag to ensure that the compiler puts each function into a separate code section in the generated object files. To perform the actual shuffling, we simply generate a custom linker script that enforces a shuffled order of all the code sections, and hence of all functions. The order is determined with a pseudo-random number generator that is seeded with the diversification seed.
This process builds completely on existing linker functionality. No patch to ld is needed to let it generate the diversified function orders. For generating the linker script, we extract all the linked-in functions from the linker map file. All linkers we know can produce such a file, which basically documents how the original (i.e., default) linker script was executed on the linked objects.
To replay the shuffling accurately on the crash server, the information extracted from the linker map file is needed, i.e., the names and sizes of linked-in functions, as well as their alignment requirements. These can be obtained from the linker map file and from the object files generated during the default compilation: the alignment requirements of functions correspond to those of their corresponding code sections in the object files. Those section alignment requirements are explicitly encoded in the object files to allow correct linking. We extract them to include them in the opportunity log. During the replay, they are useful to predict the amount of padding that needs to be inserted before each function in the diversified binary, such that that amount of padding does not need to be included in the ∆data.
NOP Insertion
Finally, we use the (post-)link-time binary code rewriter Diablo (https://github.com/diablo-rewriter/) [12] to perform randomized NOP insertion, implementing a decision process as discussed in Section 3.3. In our implementation, Diablo inserts a NOP in between every consecutive pair of instructions in a basic block with a user-controlled probability. For our experiments, we set this probability to 20%. More complex schemes, that introduce more entropy in the offsets between individual instructions in function bodies can easily be envisioned. Introducing many more NOPs will likely not be acceptable, however, as it obviously inflates the code size. As long as the more complex schemes have a decision process along the lines of the one discussed in Section 3.3, with a fixed number of random numbers drawn per basic block, we conjecture that the ∆data size will not be impacted significantly.
To replay the NOP insertion on the server, the opportunity log lists the functions' basic blocks, their offsets to the function entry, and their numbers of instructions. These lists are produced by Diablo on the basis of the function CFGs it constructs for the default binary. Since the number of instructions per basic block can be different in a diversified binary as a result of stack padding, this allows for relatively, but not completely accurate replay on the crash server.
∆data
The uncompressed ∆data generated with our proof-ofconcept implementation consists of human-readable ASCII text. With more engineering, smaller patch sizes can be obtained, so the reported (compressed) ∆data sizes put an upper bound on what could be achieved with a more fine-tuned implementation. If authenticity, integrity and confidentiality are required for the ∆data it can also be encrypted and signed. This obviously adds some extra data. For example, when we employed GPG (GNU Privacy Guard, https://www.gnupg.org/) to encrypt with AES256 and sign using the SHA-1 hash and RSA, the ∆data grows with 354-356 bytes (depending on the needed padding).
Benchmarks and Correctness
For evaluating our approach and the correctness of our implementation, we use the C and C++ programs from the SPEC2006 benchmark suite. We evaluated the approach on dynamically linked binaries, all of which also include the BreakPad client next to the actual code. The dynamically linked, position-dependent binaries were compiled at optimization levels -O1, -O2, -Os, and -O3. For all four levels, we evaluated two versions: with and without the -fomit-frame-pointer option. So in total, we evaluated the benchmarks on eight compilation flag combinations.
For each of those eight combinations, we diversified the benchmarks using 30 tuples of three random seeds, one for each diversification scheme we implemented. All diversified versions compiled and executed correctly with our patches and three-step diversification. Hence our diversification implementation can be considered validated.
We also validated the correctness of the ∆Breakpad approach. The stack padding randomization and function shuffling are done by tools that support the generation of the necessary DWARF debug information for generating symbol files. So for those diversification schemes, we checked and confirm that the diversified symbol files generated with our approach (i.e., on the basis of undiversified symbol files, the opportunity log, and ∆data) are equivalent to symbol files obtained directly with the symbol dumper from the debug info in the diversified binaries.
For the diversified benchmark versions with randomized NOP-insertion, we could not deploy the above approach, because Diablo lacks the functionality to generate debug information in a rewritten binary. In other words, there exists no ground truth version of the diversified symbol file to compare against. So instead we evaluated the correctness of our diversified symbol file reconstruction approach by comparing actual crash reports. Because those report source line numbers, reports produced with Breakpad for crashes of the default binaries and reports produced with ∆Breakpad for equivalent crashes of the diversified binaries should be identical. To that extent, we generated many versions of each diversified benchmark version with all three diversification schemes combined. In each of those versions, one BKPT instruction is injected into the application, at a random location. When that breakpoint instruction is executed, it raises an exception that triggers the generation of a crash report. We also injected such BKPT instructions in the undiversified version of each benchmark, at the same program point in the code section. We then generated crash reports for the default version and for the diversified versions by triggering the BKPT using standard SPEC inputs, and checked that the generated reports were indeed identical. All such checks were positive.
Overhead
We evaluated the overheads introduced by the ∆Breakpad approach with the two ∆ minimization techniques from Section 3.4 enabled. For benchmarks compiled with -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer, Table 1 contains the maximum and average sizes of the ∆data for our three techniques in isolation (A-C) and for all three combined (D). The listed ∆data sizes are the sizes of the bzipped data, or simply the size of the random seeds if there was no other ∆data to be compressed. As the ∆data sizes vary from one diversified version to another, we list their average size as well as the maximal sizes we observed during our experiments. These sizes are indicated with "(avg)" and "(max)" resp. The numbers (E) given for the opportunity logs for three techniques combined are also compressed using bzip2, as these files are quite large but very compressible. Also given are the sizes of the default (F) as well as the diversified symbol files (G), and the sizes of the corresponding stripped binaries (H and J). For the default binaries, we also report the average stack depth (I) observed over their execution on SPEC training inputs. This size corresponds to the amount of stack data that needs to be sent to a crash server in a minidump. As for the exection times, the table lists the time needed to compile and link the default binary (K); to generate the ∆data (L); to create a stack trace for a crash in the main function of the default binary, which requires no stack unwinding (M); and to produce the diversified symbol file on the crash server once ∆ data comes is delivered with a minidump (N). The timing data was gathered using the Python timeit module on a machine with 16 GB of main memory and an Intel i7-4790 CPU. To put the absolute numbers in the table in perspective, four columns contain relative numbers on the right and aggregated numbers at the bottom of the table. The formulas to compute the relative numbers are detailed in the header rows. We did not include execution times for generating the actual diversification. For our implementations of randomized stack padding and function shuffling, which are implemented as small modifications to the default compilation and linking process, the extra computation time needed to perform the diversification is negligible. The (post-)linktime NOP-insertion that we implemented on top of the Diablo binary rewriting framework takes a significant amount of time. We only used Diablo to demonstrate that our ∆Breakpad approach works well even if multiple, different tools deploy complementary schemes of diversity, however. A much faster implementation of NOP-insertion in the compiler is easy to engineer and would introducing negligible compile time overhead. So it makes no sense to include the run times of the Diablo-based tool in the evaluation.
From the results in Table 1 , we can draw the several conclusions. First, the size of the ∆data is small. Even for the three techniques combined the extra ∆data to be stored in the binaries is roughly three orders of magnitude smaller than the binary size for each benchmark. Compared to the average stack size, which is a good indication of the average size of minidumps to be send to a server, the ∆data can range from negligible for the sphinx3 benchmark to relatively large, such as for omnetpp benchmark. Thus, the need to send ∆data can significantly increase the amount of data to be send to the crash server. However, the increase is relatively high only for programs with shallow stacks. The absolute increase is, in each case still limited to less then four kilobytes.
Secondly, the symbol files barely increase as a result of diversification, and the opportunity logs are about an order of magnitude smaller than the symbol files. We can thus conclude that on the client as well as on the server, only a relatively small price is paid in terms of storage for allowing diversified symbol files to be recreated.
Thirdly, the computation times required to produce the ∆data on the build system and to produce the diversified symbol files on the crash collector server are significant. An important remark needs to be made, however. Both the generation of the ∆data on the build system and the reconstruction of the diversified symbol file on the crash collector are currently implemented in Python. Most of the execution time is spent in reading and parsing the default symbol file, and in allocating the internal data structures that represent it. These steps can be optimized significantly, by preprocessing the default symbol file such that it can be mapped into memory with one file open operation, by re-implementing the scripts in a performance-oriented programming language, and by redesigning the internal data structures for performance instead of research flexibility. The reported processing times are therefore only a large over-approximation of what more fine-tuned imple- mentations will be able to achieve. We are hence confident that the computational overhead on both the build system and the crash collector server can be reduced to acceptable levels. With a reduction with one order of magnitude, which certainly seems within reach, the overhead on the crash server could be reduced to approximately a doubling of the computation time needed to produce a crash report.
Fourthly, the observations for C++ programs are in line with those for C programs. Figure 8 charts the main result, i.e., the ∆data size, in function of the default binary code size for different compiler optimization levels (always with the ∆ minimization techniques enabled). The correlation between the two attributes of code size and ∆data sizes is clear, and it is also clear that the results are quite similar for the different optimization levels and FP option. An interesting point to note is that for some benchmarks, such as povray, the ∆data is consistently smaller for code compiled with the -fomit-frame-pointer option. For other benchmarks, such as gcc and xalanc, the opposite holds true. The difference is relatively small, however, and certainly not as much as one would expect from the average deltas in the variation in function code size with and without the -fomit-frame-pointer option, i.e., the 0.052 bytes/function with it versus the 0.028 bytes/function without it that were presented in Figure 6 parts (a) and (b). One reason is that, as can be seen in Table 1 , stack padding is responsible for only about 30% of total ∆data size. Another reason is that the growth in average deltas stems mostly from non-zero deltas in function versions becoming bigger when the code is compiled without FP, rather than from zero deltas becoming non-zero ones, as explained in Section 3.4.1. If a non-zero delta grows, the patch size most often remains the same. For example, having to patch the size of a code region from 32 to 36 requires just as much space in the ∆data patch as patching the size from 32 to 40. So most of the differences in code size causing the 0.028 to grow to 0.052 bytes/function do not result in larger ∆data.
Finally, Figure 9 visualizes the effect on average ∆data sizes for each benchmark compiled with -O2 -similar re-sults are obtained at other optimization levels-of omitting FPs where possible, and of deploying the ∆ minimization technique discussed in Section 3.4.2. We did not include the effect of default padding (Section 3.4.1) because that does not involve any trade-off, as it does not effect the diversified binaries themselves. It can be seen that omitting the FP and enabling the SP/FP optimization we disabled as part of the ∆ minimization can have significant positive as well as significant negative effects on the ∆data size. The impact varies from one benchmark to another, but the average effect is rather small.
Because the whole ∆data of a diversified benchmark version is more or less equal to a concatenation of ∆data chunks of the benchmark's functions, and because the effects of ommitting the FP and of disabling the SP/FP optimization are also local to functions, the absolute effect of those compilation options on a benchmark's total ∆data size is also mostly a sum of their effects on a large amount of individual functions. If we assume that the large set of functions in our benchmark suite is partitioned randomly into the sets of functions of the individual benchmarks, we expect the results shown in Figure 9 to look more like Gaussian distributions than like uniform ones. And that is what we see. We conclude that if one's goal is to minimize the ∆data size, the compiler options should not be enabled or disabled per benchmark. Instead a choice should be made for each individual function. With machine learning, or maybe even simple human analysis and engineering, we conjecture that it is relatively straightforward to adapt a compiler for this goal. Still, it would be much more intrusive than the small patch we now deployed to let LLVM inject the randomized stack padding. So a trade-off needs to be made. Given the already small sizes of the ∆data with our implementation, we considered it not interesting to investigate this any further as of yet.
RELATED WORK
In the past, both spatial and temporal software diversity has been proposed as a solution to a wide range of problems: Instruction set randomization can prevent, or at least delay, reverse-engineering and tampering [13] . Multi-variant execution can be used to detect malware intrusions [14] . Limited, rather coarse-grained forms of run-time randomization, such as address space layout randomization (ASLR), are widely used and significantly raise the bar for memory corruption attacks [15] . In the academic literature, more fine-grained forms of diversification have been proposed to raise the bar even further [10] , [16] , including for code dynamically generated with JIT compilers [17] . Dynamic temporal diversity has been proposed to mitigate timing side channel attacks [18] . Advanced software fingerprinting schemes can help in identifying the source of illegitimate software copies [19] . Diversification can prevent collusion attacks to identify software vulnerabilities based on patches [20] . Some software vendors diversify the code of their applications when major new versions are released, to hide the location of the new, valuable functionality in the new versions. Obfuscation tools and other software protection tools inherently rely on diversification to minimize the learning capabilities of attackers and to achieve Fig. 9 : Impact on ∆data sizes from omitting the FP and from disabling the FP/SP optimization (on benchmarks with compiled with FP) in LLVM (Section 3.4.2) for benchmarks compiled at -O2.
stealthiness [21] . Microsoft diversifies the Window's system call numbering over time to prevent (malicious and beging) software targeting APIs they do not want to keep backwards compatible [22] . With the exception of the latter form of diversification, the other forms can only provide strong protection if code is diversified, i.e., if the diversification is not limited to changes in the embedded data.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented the ∆Breakpad approach to enable crash reporting on diversified software. We validated this approach for applications on which multiple finegrained layout/offset diversifications are deployed. The tool and diversification techniques require only minimal adaptations to the build tool chain, and only a small price in storage space and communication bandwidth is paid to support the approach.
Further improvements to our approach can be made with respect to the employed diversification schemes. Currently these are rather simple, and it is worthwhile to investigate whether more complex techniques, such as techniques that can be deployed at install time or at load time, or even at run time, or techniques that can stop non-control data exploits, can be supported and whether that will result in a larger overhead in terms of ∆data.
